

Unweaving the AML/CTF system

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Technology and Anti-Money Laundering

A Systems Theory and Risk-Based Approach



Dionysios S. Demetis

Διονύσιος Σ. Δημέτις

- i. AML domain
- ii. CTF
- iii. Risk-based approach

Individuals/groups



Criminal Activity




Profits



ML

(masking the origin of funds)

Individuals/groups



Criminal Activity




Profits



ML

(masking the origin of funds)






Transactions/data



Financial Institutions

KYC




CDD/ECDD



Sanctions



PEPs



Transactions/data



Financial Institutions



Suspicious Activity Report (SAR)

KYC

CDD/ECDD

Sanctions

PEPs

Transactions/data



KYC
CDD/ECDD
Sanctions
PEPs


Financial Institutions




Suspicious Activity Report (SAR)



Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU)






● No FIU


● No Annual Reports /
STR information

● Not in Egmont


● FIU established




$n=2$




$n=8$




$n=50$



$n=25$





‘Criminals don’t have to sign MoUs’


– Judge J.

“... the (legal) system as a unity can never decide the basis of what is legal or illegal. It can never apply the code to itself as a system. There is no foundational value establishing what is legal or illegal, only operations”

“...it enables the **legal** system to operate **legally** (!) by declaring that something is legal or against the law”


*Niklas Luhmann (2008): Law as a Social System,
Oxford University Press*





■ Total number of SARs (UK)

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




Total number of SARs (US)




Total number of SARs (US)





Total number of SARs (US)



* Increasing Reporting Entities

* Training/ Raising Awareness

* Compliance Fear

TECHNOLOGY

TECHNOLOGY

‘simulating money laundering behaviour by using sequences of transacting patterns, common ML typologies, etc’

1) A lot of data

A lot of **raw transaction data** that one has to manipulate in order to 'find' suspicious cases

2) Algorithms try to make sense of that data

We do our best to come up with algorithms, patterns, queries, thresholds, and so on.. techniques that will 'model' the behaviour of ML

3) Humans reduce the complexity further

ML Analysts are forced to do that every day, from the many suspicious cases generated by TMS

$$\text{TPR} = \frac{\text{'truly' suspicious cases after Manual analysis}}{\text{TMS-generated suspicious alerts}}$$

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
$$= \frac{10}{100} = 10 \%$$

Survey by Syntax

- * Type of technology they use
- * What they think of AML-technology
- * What is their *True Positive Rate (TPR)*
- * What they think of regulators
- * How many queries they use for profiling


*Type of technology they use

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
*What they think of AML technology

* What they think of AML technology




* True Positive Rate (TPR)


* True Positive Rate (TPR)



* What they think of regulators

* What they think of regulators





**“When a lot of
different remedies
are suggested for a
disease that means
the disease can’t
be cured”.**

Anton Chekhov



Terrorism

POLITICS : SECURITY

Nun Terrorized by Terror Watch

Ryan Singel  09.26.05

Sister Glenn Anne McPhee is a busy woman.

As the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops' secretary for education, Sister McPhee oversees Catholic education in the United States, from nursery school through post-graduate. Her job includes working with the Department of Education, speaking frequently at conferences and scrutinizing religious textbooks to clear them with the teachings of the church.

For nine months in 2003 and 2004, Sister McPhee also took on the task of clearing her name from the government's no-fly list, an endeavor that proved fruitless until she called on a higher power, the White House.

"I got to the point I could hardly go to the airport, because I couldn't anticipate what would happen and I couldn't do anything," she said in an interview with Wired News. "I missed key addresses I was to give. I finally got to the point where I always checked my bag, because after I got through the police clearance, then they would put me through special security where they wand you from head to foot all

clearance, then they would put me through special security where they wand you from head to foot all time. I usually got to the point where I always checked my bag, because after I got through the police and I couldn't do anything," she said in an interview with Wired News. "I missed key addresses I was to give. I finally got to the point where I always checked my bag, because after I got through the police clearance, then they would put me through special security where they wand you from head to foot all

[Home](#) > [Fox 8 News](#)

6-Year-Old Northeast Ohio Girl on 'No Fly' List



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Video :-



Countering the
Financing of Terrorism

Table 1: The direct attack costs of a terrorist conspiracy

Attack	Date	Estimated cost ³
London transport system	7 July 2005	GBP 8 000 ⁴
Madrid train bombings,	11 March 2004	USD 10 000
Istanbul truck bomb attacks,	15 & 20 November 2003	USD 40 000
Jakarta JW Marriot Hotel bombing	5 August 2003	USD 30 000
Bali bombings	12 October 2002	USD 50 000
USS Cole attack	12 October 2000	USD 10 000
East Africa embassy bombings,	7 August 1998	USD 50 000

¹ Obligations set out chiefly in UNSCR 1373, 2001.

² Including: Comras (2005), Kohlmann (2006), National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (2004) Williams (2005), Abuza (2005) and Prober (2005).

³ Unless otherwise noted, all estimates adapted from the August 2004 report of the UN Monitoring Team Report on al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

⁴ The United Kingdom Home Office (2006).

‘those sums spent by active terrorist cells on the preparations for a conventional terrorist attack are typically so small as to be mere droplets in the ocean of daily financial transactions’

Parkman and Peeling (2007), Countering Terrorist Finance, Ashgate publishing company

7%

“It should be acknowledged as well that financial institutions will probably be unable to detect terrorist financing as such. Indeed, the only time that financial institutions might clearly identify terrorist financing as distinct from other criminal misuse of the financial system is when a known terrorist or terrorist organization has opened an account”

FATF Guidance notes on TF

Algorithmic Racism

i.e.: racial and religious indicators are embedded in algorithmic representations for monitoring the probability of terrorist financing



**Opinion 14/2011
on data protection issues related to the prevention of money laundering and
terrorist financing**

Adopted on 13 June 2011

Adopted on 13 June 2011

Probability of a known terrorist opening an account?

30 years of data

1400 terrorist organizations

12,200 terrorist attacks were recorded in that time
frame

169 different countries

1400 terrorist organizations

1400 terrorist organizations



8 organizations

1400 terrorist organizations



8 organizations



\$2648 (Taliban)



Official Secrets Act 1989

1989 CHAPTER 6

An Act to replace section 2 of the Official Secrets Act 1911 by provisions protecting more limited classes of official information. [11th May 1989]

Be it enacted by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:—

and by the authority of the same, as follows:—

Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:—

Risk-based approach

Risk

“to find something meaningful in all that data for forecasting purposes must be so plainly impossible that there will always be endless scope for well-paid advice on how to do it”

Peter Kennedy (2003),
Introduction to Econometrics
MIT Press

$$R = P * I$$

$$R = P * I$$


$$R = \text{unknown} * \text{unknown}$$

$$R = P * I$$

$$R = \text{unknown} * \text{unknown}$$

$$R = (\text{unknown})^2$$

$$\sqrt{\text{Risk}} = \text{unknown}$$



La clef des champs



There is no such thing as a
non-risk-based approach.

*The word 'approach' necessarily includes
risk.*

‘complexity in this sense means being forced to select; being forced to select means contingency; and contingency means **risk**’

*Luhmann, N (1995) Social Systems,
Stanford University Press*


“since Bacon, Locke, and Vico, confidence in the feasibility of generating circumstances has grown; and to a large extent it has been assumed that knowledge and feasibility correlate.

This pretension corrects itself to a certain degree with the concept of risk, as it does in other ways with the newly invented probabilistic calculation. Both concepts appear to be able to guarantee that even if things do go wrong, one could have acted correctly”

Luhmann, N (1993)
Risk: A Sociological Theory



AML (risk)

- high/low risk products or services
- high-risk customers (e.g. cash intensive businesses)



Any category is a **risk-based hybrid** of **both**
high- and low- ML/TF risks

To deal with the risk-based approach, we need context-sensitive data that will act as *2nd order proxies for determining risk-levels of risk-categories.*



Isolation.

Financial
Institution

AML

money laundering



THIS CERTIFIES THAT THERE HAVE BEEN

DEPOSITED IN THE TREASURY OF THE

UNITED

STATES

5

>33709659<

>33709659<

EXAMINED AND TRUE

RECEIVED FOR DEPOSIT

Wm. H. ...
Register of the Treasury

5

FIVE SILVER DOLLARS

5

Ellis H. Roberts
Comptroller of the Treasury





FEDERAL RESERVE NOTE

AE 77665544 B
E5




THIS NOTE IS LEGAL TENDER
FOR ALL DEBTS, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE

Mary Ellen McManus
Treasurer of the United States

SERIES
1990

A 2

100



FRANKLIN

UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA



AE 77665544 B

Robert E. Rubin
Secretary of the Treasury

A 100

100

ONE HUNDRED DOLLARS



QQ: China's New Coin of the Realm?

Officials Try to Crack Down As Fake Online Currency Is Traded for Real Money

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By [GEOFFREY A. FOWLER](#) and [JUYING QIN](#)

HONG KONG -- China's fastest-rising currency isn't the yuan. It's the QQ coin -- online play money created by marketers to sell such things as virtual flowers for instant-message buddies, cellphone ringtones and magical swords for online games.

In recent weeks, the QQ coin's real-world value has risen as much as 70%.

It's the most extreme case of a so-called virtual currency blurring the boundaries between the online and real worlds -- and challenging legal limits. A Chinese Internet company called [Tencent Holdings](#) Ltd. designed the payment system in 2002 to allow its 233 million regular registered users to shop for treats in its virtual world. Virtual currencies are in use in many countries -- but nowhere have they taken root more deeply than in China.

Copyright © 2005 by CNN

urrencies are in use in many countries -- but nowhere have they taken root more
its 233 million regular registered users to shop for treats in its virtual world. Virtual
company called Tencent Holdings Ltd. designed the payment system in 2002 to allow

Non face-to-face interactions

*only 30.2% online!

<http://www.demetis.com>